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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
corporation,

]
]

Plaintiff/Respondent,

]
i

CASE NO.

v.
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah corporation,
Defendant/Petitioner.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Defendant/Petitioner, Motor Cargo (Motor Cargo), by and
through its counsel of record, submits the following Petition for
Writ of Certiorari.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court and Ct>urt of Appeals,

improperly disregarded the fundamental rule of construction that
ambiguities in an insurance agreement should be construed against
its drafter.
2.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that

the extrinsic evidence received by the trial court supports a
finding that Motor Cargo knew it would lose its right to an
excess premium refund in the event of early cancellation of its
insurance agreement with Truck Insurance Exchange.
1316/JHS
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OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
On July 30, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its
Opinion (hereinafter referred to as Appellate Court Opinion)
affirming the judgment rendered by the Second Judicial District
Court of Davis County, State of Utah, in favor of
plaintiff/respondent, Truck Insurance Exchange (TIE) and against
Motor Cargo.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
As noted above, the Court of Appeals entered its
decision in this matter on July 30, 1990.

On August 10, 1990,

Motor Cargo filed its Petition for Rehearing.

On August 17,

1990, the Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Rehearing.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a), this Court has
jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Appeals by a
writ of certiorari.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
TIE brought this action against Motor Cargo to collect
on amounts allegedly due TIE under a Retrospective Premium
Determination Agreement - Plan III (Retro Agreement B) entered
into between the parties.

The parties filed cross motions for

summary judgment in the trial court.

The trial court granted

TIE'S Motion for Summary Judgment as to its First Cause of
Action, while denying it summary judgment on its Second Cause of
1316/JHS
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Action.

In addition, the trial court denied Motor Cargo's

Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim, but granted
Motor Cargo leave to amend.

As part of its Order and Judgment,

the trial court stayed execution on the Judgment until all
remaining claims asserted by the parties were fully adjudicated.
On the remaining claims and accompanying issues not
resolved by the above Order and Judgment, and pursuant to Rule
39(b) and Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a
trial was held on stipulated facts, affidavits of the parties,
and the summary judgment and other memoranda in support of the
various positions of the parties.

The trial court thereafter

issued its Memorandum Decision, granting judgment in favor of TIE
on its First and Second Causes of Action, less a partial setoff
by Motor Cargo for credit held by TIE, and dismissing Motor
Cargo's First Cause of Action in its Amended Counterclaim
asserting an excess premium refund of $56,931 to which Motor
Cargo is entitled and which is confirmed by tTIE's own records.
The trial court held that this Order and Judgment superseded its
summary judgment noted above, and subsequently made and entered
it Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (findings and
Conclusions).

(R. 388.)

In its Findings and Conclusions, the trial court
specifically concluded as a matter of law th^t Retro Agreement B
was clear and unambiguous and entitled TIE to judgment in the
amount of $68,394 plus interest, together wit;h attorneys' fees in
1316/JHS
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the amount of $14,500.

In addition, the trial court made

conclusions of law concerning the material provisions in Retro
Agreement B upon which it based its decision.

(Id.)

Motor Cargo appealed the trial court's decision to this
Court.

The appeal was thereafter poured over to the Court of

Appeals for decision, which resulted in affirmance of the trial
court.

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals held that

the trial court erred in its conclusion of law that Retro
Agreement B was unambiguous, reasoning that two paragraphs
therein directly conflicted with one another regarding Motor
Cargo's right to an excess premium refund.

The Court of Appeals,

however, further concluded that the extrinsic evidence admitted
by the trial court sufficiently established that Motor Cargo knew
it would lose its right to a refund in the event of early
cancellation.
Motor Cargo now seeks a writ of certiorari from this
Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Motor Cargo is a Utah trucking company and common

carrier with its principal place of business in North Salt Lake,
Utah.

(R. 24.)
2.

TIE is an insurer in the State of Utah which

specializes in writing insurance policies for common carriers
such as Motor Cargo.
1316/JHS

(R. 1.)
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3.

Pursuant to the application of Motor Cargo and the

terms of an agreement between the parties dated March 1, 1979,
designated as "Retrospective Premium Determination Agreement Plan III (Retro Agreement A ) , TIE issued its policy of insurance
No, 6120-00-40 (the Policy) to Motor Cargo, having an effective
date of March 1, 1979.
4.

(R. 389.)

From March 1, 1979 to March 1, 1982, the term of

Retro Agreement A and the Policy, TIE provided insurance coverage
to Motor Cargo.
5.

(R. 390.)

At Motor Cargo's request, th$ Policy was renewed

for an additional three-year period beginning on March 1, 1982,
and a second Retrospective Premium Determination Agreement - Plan
III (Retro Agreement B) was executed by the parties.

Id.

A true

and accurate copy of Retro Agreement B is attached as Exhibit C
to the Complaint.
6.

(R. 11-14.)

Retro Agreement B, signed by the parties on March

2, 1982, was identical to Retro Agreement A except for certain
percentage changes in the definition portion of Retro Agreement
B.

(R. 6-9, 11-14.)
7.

The Retro Agreements generally provide for a basic

premium which Motor Cargo was required to pay on a monthly basis,
but which allow adjustments to that premiumfc>Yway of additional
payments by Motor Cargo or credits or refunds to Motor Cargo for
any excess payments.

1316/JHS
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8.

Retrospective rating under the Retro Agreements

provides a method of determining, in retrospect, what the final
earned premium for the Policy will be for the agreed term of the
Policy.

Retrospective rating is designed to benefit an insured

with a good loss experience record.
9.

(R. 391.)

Determining premiums retrospectively in the manner

set forth in the Retro Agreements benefits the insured by
allowing it the option of partial self-insurance, and because of
the retrospective retention, of achieving broader insurance
coverage at a reduced cost compared to the premium for similar
coverage under a standard policy.
10.

(Id.)

Paragraph 16 of Retro Agreement B clearly

establishes a right in both TIE and Motor Cargo to cancel the
Policy prior to expiration of the term.

Specifically, paragraph

16(a) provides that if Motor Cargo cancels the Policy, the
premium due TIE "shall be computed in accordance with the other
provisions" of Retro Agreement B, but that at a minimum, the
premium would be 110% of the Retrospective Premium or Basic
Premium, whichever is greater,.
11.

(R. 14.)

Paragraph 13 of Retro Agreement B provides, among

other things, that Motor Cargo would be refunded, periodically
throughout the term of the Policy, any excess premium paid to
TIE.

Paragraph 13 in relevant part states:
ADJUSTMENT OF PREMIUM. After computing the
Retrospective Premium at the 60-day, 6-month,
12-month, 24-month, and 36-month periods, and

1316/JHS
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provided the Retrospective Premium for the
term of this agreement is less than all
premium paid to the Exchange upon said
policy, the Exchange shall, after each such
computation . . . refund such excess premium
to the Insured at such time and in the manner
requested, . . . .
(R. 13.)

(Emphasis supplied.)
12.

Prior to execution of Retro Agreement B by Motor

Cargo's representative, TIE'S representative explained to him
that if Motor Cargo canceled Retro Agreement B

before the three-

year term ended, it would lose "the benefit^ of retrospective
rating."

(R. 229-30.)
13.

In addition to the forgoing discussion between

Motor Cargo and TIE, Motor Cargo's officer, Harold Tate, met with
William K. Maxwell, a former insurance agent of TIE, who advised
him, following a careful review of Retro Agreement B, that in his
opinion Motor Cargo would not lose its right to an excess premium
refund in the event of early cancellation.
14.

(R. 176.)

On February 28, 1983, Motor C^rgo exercised its

right of cancellation under paragraph 16 of Retro Agreement B by
giving written notice to TIE of its intention to cancel all
insurance policies then in effect between Motor Cargo and TIE,
including the Policy.
15.

(R. 15.)

In accordance with the notice of cancellation, TIE

canceled the Policy as of February 28, 1983.
16.

(R. 16.)

Following cancellation of the Policy,

TIE

submitted a premium report to Motor Cargo dated September 30,
1316/JHS

1985 which, in accordance with paragraph 13, showed that Motor
Cargo was entitled to a premium refund of $56,931, A copy of the
premium report is attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of
William K. Maxwell.
17.

(R. 180.)

Following submission of the premium report to

Motor Cargo, TIE sent Motor Cargo a final invoice showing a
premium due of $68,394.

The invoice, however, failed to credit

Motor Cargo for the excess premium refund of $56,931 rightfully
due Motor Cargo under paragraph 13 and confirmed by the premium
report previously submitted by TIE.

(R. 392-93.)

A copy of the

final invoice is attached as Exhibit G to the Affidavit of Paul
J. Semons.

(R. 169.)
18.

Motor Cargo took issue with TIE'S calculation of

the premium due under Retro Agreement B.

Thereafter, on

October 12, 1983, TIE filed a Complaint against Motor Cargo to
recover the above amounts allegedly due under the Retro
Agreements.
19.

(R. 1-16.)
Following discovery, the parties filed cross

motions for summary judgment.
20.

(R. 135-72, 173-74, 181-97.)

Following the trial court's ruling on the cross

motions for summary judgment, the parties submitted for trial the
resolution of Motor Cargo's First Cause of Action in its Amended
Counterclaim concerning all premium refunds due to Motor Cargo
under Retro Agreement B.

1316/JHS
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21.

Following trial, the trial court, having reviewed

the stipulated facts,1 affidavits of the parties, memoranda in
support of the various positions of the parties and arguments of
counsel, issued its Memorandum Decision holding that Retro
Agreement B did not entitle Motor Cargo to an excess premium
refund of $56,931 under the Policy.
22.

(R. 33$-40.)

Following its decision, the trial court entered

its Findings and Conclusions.

(R. 388-97.)

For the purposes of

this Petition, the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law are material:
16. The cancellation provision was
specifically explained to an officer of Motor
Cargo when the Retro Agreement wag entered
into, that is, that in the event df
cancellation of the Policy before the three
(3) year term ended, Motor Cargo would lose
the benefit of retrospective ratinjq.

1. . . . The Court is required to look
to the terms of the contract and their plain
meaning on questions of interpretation. Only
when the Court, finds the contract to be
ambiguous or inconsistent may it turn to the
general rules of construction, i.ej. favoring
The parties, pursuant to Rule 39(a) (1)| of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, entered into a Stipulation on or about
December 15 1987, basically setting forth th0 facts stipulated to
for the purpose of the trial. The affidavit^ motions and
memoranda in support of the various position^ of the parties were
attached as exhibits to the Stipulation. Du^ to reasons unknown
by Motor Cargo, the Stipulation, although relied upon by the
trial court in making its decision, is not p^rt of the record on
appeal. Thus, Motor Cargo refers to the Addendum at the end of
this brief which incorporates the Stipulation as part of the
record on appeal. See Addendum, infra.
1316/JHS
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specific provisions over general, first dated
provisions over later/ and construction
against the scrivener,
•

• • •

7. Paragraph 13 of [Retro Agreement B]
provides for adjustments to the premium for
any excess premium under certain
circumstances.
8. Paragraph 16 of [Retro Agreement B]
provides, among other things, that either
party may cancel on thirty (30) days written
notice and that the premium of cancellation
prior to the end of the term shall be
computed in accordance with the other
provisions of [Retro Agreement B], subject to
the additional provisions in Paragraph 16.
9. One of the additional provisions of
Paragraph 16 provides, in part, that if the
insured cancels, the minimum earned premium
shall be 110% of the Retrospective or Basic
Premium, whichever is greater.

11. Paragraph 16 specifically makes any
manner of calculation in [Retro Agreement B]
subject to the provisions of subparagraph
16(a) which specifically establishes the
minimum earned premium upon cancellation at
110% of the Retrospective Premium or Basic
Premium, whichever is greater. This
paragraph makes no mention of any adjustments
to these calculations, nor that there is to
be a penalty of 10% of any premium so
adjusted.
12. Based upon the foregoing, the Court
concludes that [Retro Agreement B] under its
terms is clear and unambiguous and that the
earned premium on cancellation by the
insured, Motor Cargo, is equal to 110% of the
Basic Premium or Retrospective Premium,
whichever is greater, as calculated pursuant
to Paragraphs 4, subparagraphs (a), (b), and
1316/JHS
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(c); Paragraph 12, and Paragraph tL6 of [Retro
Agreement B ] .
(R. 393-97.)
23.

(Emphasis supplied.)
On February 13, 1989, the trial court entered its

Order and Judgment in accordance with its Conclusions of Law.
(R. 398-99.)
24.

Motor Cargo thereafter appealed the trial court's

judgment to the Court of Appeals, claiming t^hat the trial court
had erred, inter alia, as follows:
(a)

In concluding that RetrO Agreement B was

(b)

In concluding that Motorr Cargo was not

unambiguous;

entitled to an excess premium refund following early
cancellation; and
(c)

In concluding that the extrinsic evidence

admitted into evidence established that Motor Cargo knew it would
lose its right to a premium refund in the evtent of early
cancellation.
25.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the

trial court, reasoning:
Two of the agreement's pertinent
provisions directly conflict with one
another. Paragraph 13 provides for the
refund of excess retrospective premiums,
following the computation of the I
retrospective premiums at specified time
intervals. Paragraph 16, on the other hand,
provides that ff[t]he premium for a
cancellation prior to the end of tne term of
this agreement shall be computed in
1316/JHS
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accordance with the other provisions of this
agreement, subject to the following
additional provisions." (Emphasis added.)
The operative additional provision in
Paragraph 16 reads "the minimum earned
premium shall be 110% of the Retrospective or
Basic Premium, whichever is the greater, but
the amount so calculated shall not exceed the
Standard Premium as defined in this
agreement. . . . " The trial court determined
that since the basic premium was higher than
the retrospective premium, Motor Cargo was
not entitled to the excess premiums.
* * *

We disagree with the trial court's legal
conclusion that the contract in this case is
unambiguous. Paragraph 16 acknowledges the
refund provision of paragraph 13, while at
the same time imposing a penalty that
arguably disregards Paragraph 13. A plain
reading of the contract does not indicate
whether "in accordance with" Paragraph 13
controls over the contract being "subject to"
the additional provisions of Paragraph 16.
Nor does a plain reading lead to the sure
conclusion that Motor Cargo would give up the
premium refund plus pay a penalty rather than
being subject to the more customary trade
penalty of ten percent.
Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to
construe an ambiguous contract. See 50 W.
Broadway Assoc., 784 P.2d at 1171; Kimball,
699 P.2d at 716. This contract's ambiguity
reguires extrinsic evidence in order for the
contract to be properly interpreted. The
court received such extrinsic evidence and
refers to it in the findings. Such evidence
showed that the parties discussed the
provisions at issue prior to entering into
the agreement and that they knew the excess
premium refund would be lost in the event of
cancellation by Motor Cargo. We therefore
hold that the trial court correctly admitted
extrinsic evidence in this case and, under
the standard set forth in Kimball, we leave
the court's findings of act undisturbed.
12

Appellate Court Opinion, pp. 2-3 (footnote Emitted and emphasis
added).
26.

Motor Cargo now seeks a writ of certiorari to

review the decision of the Court of Appeals^

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE FUNDAMENTAL
RULE OF CONSTRUCTION THAT AMBIGUITIES IN AN
INSURANCE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AGAINST
ITS DRAFTER.

In reaching its decision to affirm the trial court, the
Court of Appeals improperly failed to consider and apply a
fundamental rule of construction that ambiguities in an insurance
contract should be strictly construed against its drafter.
L.D.S. Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858-59
(Utah 1988); Metropolitan Property & Liability v. Finlayson, 751
The Court of Appeals1 apparent

P.2d 254, 257 (Utah App. 1988).

failure to apply this critical rule of consttuction to Retro
Agreement B, an insurance agreement, is a clear departure from
fundamental principles of insurance law.
Moreover, the unique retrospective premium agreements
at issue in this case raise a question of law regarding contract
construction not previously settled by this Court.

In this

regard, a decision by the Utah Supreme Court is necessary to
provide guidance to both insurers and insureds in this unique
area of the insurance industry.
1316/JHS
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II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE RECEIVED BY THE TRIAL COURT
ESTABLISHED MOTOR CARGO'S KNOWLEDGE OF LOSING ITS
PREMIUM REFUND IN THE EVENT OF EARLY CANCELLATION.

In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals clearly
acknowledged that paragraphs 13 and 16 of Retro Agreement B, both
pertaining to Motor Cargo's right to an excess premium refund,
are in direct conflict with each other.
p. 2.

Appellate Court Opinion,

More specifically, the Court of Appeals recognized that

"Paragraph 15 acknowledges the refund provision of Paragraph 13,
while at the same time imposing a penalty that arguably
disregards Paragraph 13.ff

Id., p. 3.

Acknowledging such

ambiguity, the Court of Appeals noted that extrinsic evidence was
required to properly interpret Retro Agreement B.

A review of

the extrinsic evidence received by the trial court demonstrates
that this evidence cannot, under any interpretation, be construed
to establish that Motor Cargo knew it would lose its right to an
excess premium refund in the event of early cancellation.

In

that regard, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error.
TIE argued on appeal that the trial court's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law were based on the "unopposed and
unrefuted" affidavits submitted by TIE and that consequently
there was no basis in the record below to support a determination
that the findings and judgment were clearly erroneous.

Contrary

to TIE'S assertion, its affidavits were directly contradicted by
the admissible portions of the Affidavit of William K. Maxwell.
1316/JHS
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Specifically, Maxwell's affidavit directly refutes the
interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 16, forwarded by TIE and
purportedly supported by the affidavits of Paul J. Semons and
Wendell Wells.
Maxwell, who in the past had represented TIE, after
carefully reading Retro Agreement B, expressed to Motor Cargo's
officer, Harold Tate, that in his opinion Motor Cargo would not
lose its right to an excess premium refund in the event of early
cancellation.

(R. 176.)

Although Maxwell's opinion itself was

stricken by the trial court, the fact that this opinion was
communicated to Mr. Tate prior to Motor Cargo's decision to
cancel was admissible to support Motor Cargo's reasonable
interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 16 in the event of early
cancellation.

Moreover, Maxwell's affidavit further states that

his opinion was also based upon the opinion of another insurance
agent, James Keddington, employed by Diversified Insurance
Brokers.

(R. 176.)

Once again, although the opinion itself of

Keddington was stricken by the trial court as inadmissible
evidence, the fact that Maxwell relied on thjLs opinion is
admissible evidence, lending support to the Reasonable
interpretation of paragraphs 13 and 16 forwarded by Motor Cargo.
There were no Findings of Fact made by the trial court concerning
these communications, which implies that the trial court failed
to acknowledge this evidence.

1316/JHS
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reversible error.

The Court of Appeals did not acknowledge or

refute this error.
Moreover, upon careful review of TIE'S affidavits, it
is clear that Motor Cargo was never told by TIE that, in the
event of early cancellation under Retro Agreement B, Motor Cargo
would lose its right to an excess premium refund provided by
paragraph 13. Wendell Wells, one of TIEfs representatives,
stated in his affidavit that he conducted preliminary discussions
with representatives of Motor Cargo regarding the execution of
Retro Agreement B.

In these discussions, Wells stated that he

explained the contents of Retro Agreement B to Motor Cargofs
representatives and, in particular, "how the cancellation
provisions of paragraph 15 would apply."

Id.

He then further

explained that:
[A]11 interim refunds and premium adjustments
were subject to a final adjustment and
settlement at the end of the agreed threeyear term . . . if the agreements were
terminated by Motor Cargo before the end of
the three-year term, that the provisions of
Paragraph 16 of the Retro Agreement would
apply and that the premium then due would be
the greater of the retrospective or basic
premium computed under the terms of the
policy, plus a ten percent (10%) short-range
cancellation charge, and that Motor Cargo
would lose the benefits of retrospective
rating.
(R. 229-30.)

(Emphasis added,.)

Based upon this evidence, the

trial court specifically made Finding of Fact No. 16:
The cancellation provision was
specifically explained to an officer of Motor
1316/JHS
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Cargo when the Retro Agreement wa^ entered
into, that is, that in the event of
cancellation of the Policy before the three
(3) year term ended, Motor Cargo would lose
the benefit of retrospective rating.
(R. 392.)

(Emphasis added.)
Nowhere in the affidavits of Semor^s or Wells, or

anywhere in the record, is there any evidence that TIE explained
to Motor Cargo at the time it entered into I^etro Agreement B
that, in the event of early cancellation by Motor Cargo, it would
lose its right to an excess premium refund expressly provided for
under paragraph 13.
this shortcoming.

Finding of Fact No. 16 clearly acknowledges

The trial court erroneously equated "losing

the benefit of retrospective rating" with loping the right to an
excess premium refund.
the record.

This conclusion is totally unsupported by

The Court of Appeals appears to have made the same

erroneous conclusion.
The Court of Appeals' decision condones the trial
court's clear departure from proper construction of extrinsic
evidence to resolve ambiguities in a contract.

Simply put, the

extrinsic evidence admitted by the trial court in no way
establishes, or even purports to establish, that Motor Cargo knew
it would lose its right to an excess premium refund in the event
of early cancellation.

This clear departure is highly improper

and must be corrected by this Court.

1316/JHS
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CONCLUSION
For all the reasons discussed herein, Motor Cargo
respectfully requests that this Court grant its petition for a
writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Dated this IQ*

day of September, 1990.
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
Jay D. Gurmankin (1275)
Mark Y. Hirata (5087)
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383

By
Attorneys for Petitioner

1316/JHS

18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 13th day of September, 1990, four copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari were sent by firstclass mail with postage thereon fully prepaid to:
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES
Harold C. Verhaaren
Mark F. Bell
2180 South 1300 East. Suite 260
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

j^^as^.kjz^^
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HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3326
MARK F. BELL - 4536
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260
2180 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-6161
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
a corporation,

:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

Civil NO. 34602

MOTOR CARGO, a Utah
corporation,

:

Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendant.

:

Plaintiff,
vs.

oooOooo

All issues in this proceeding not heretofore resolved by
the Order and Judgment of the Court dated February 25, 1987,
excepting

those

claims

asserted

in

the

defendant's

Amended

Counterclaim for trade liable and interference with contract and
business advantage, were submitted to the Court for separate trial
and judgment pursuant to Rules 39(b) and 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure based upon the parties' Motions, the stipulated
facts contained in the parties' Stipulation dated December 16,
1987, (the "Stipulation"), and upon the Affidavits and Memoranda
submitted in support of their respective positions.

The Court

FILMED
APPENDIX A

thereafter entered its written Memorandum Decision dated May 20,
1988, its written Supplemental Ruling dated July 27, 1988, and its
oral ruling on January 3, 1989. Further, in accordance with the
parties' Stipulation of Dismissal dated December 14, 1988, the
Court entered its Order dated December 29, 1988, dismissing the
defendant's Amended Counterclaim.

The Court, now being fully

advised in the premises, herewith enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE") at

all times material to its Complaint in this matter was duly
licensed to conduct the business of an insurer in the State of
Utah.
2.

The defendant Motor Cargo, a Utah corporation

("Motor Cargo") at all times material to TIE'S Complaint
maintained its principal place of business in North Salt Lake,
Davis County, State of Utah.
3.

Pursuant to the application of Motor Cargo and the

terms of an agreement between the parties dated March 1, 1979,
designated as "Retrospective Premium Determination
Agreement—Plan III" ("Retro Agreement—A"), TIE issued its
policy of insurance No. 6120-00-40 (the "Policy") to Motor Cargo
having an effective date of Maxch 1, 1979. A copy of Retro
Agreement—A is attached to the parties' Stipulation as
Exhibit "0."
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4.

From March 1, 1979 to March 1, 1982, the term of the

Retro Agreement—A and the Policy, TIE provided insurance coverage
to Motor Cargo.
5.

At the request

of Motor C&rgo, the Policy was

renewed for an additional three-year period beginning on March 1,
1982,

and

a

second

Retrospective

Premium

Determination

Agreement—Plan III ("Retro Agreement—B") was executed by the
parties. A copy of Retro Agreement—B is attached to the parries'
Stipulation as Exhibit "P."
6.

The second agreement, Retro Agreement—B, signed

March 2, 1982, was identical to Retro Agreement—A except for
certain percentage changes in the definition portion of Retro
Agreement—B.
7.

The Retro Agreements generally provide for a basic

premium which Motor Cargo was required to peiy on a monthly basis,
but which allow adjustments to that premium by way of additional
payments by Motor Cargo or credits or refunds to Motor Cargo for
any excess payments.
8.

The Retro Agreements and the Policy are somewhat

unique to TIE and allowed Motor Cargo a much broader insurance
coverage at substantial savings over a standard or fixed-rate
policy conditioned upon Motor Cargo's loss history and the extent
to which Motor Cargo is determined to be self insuring.
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9.

Retrospective rating under the Retro Agreements

provides a method of determining, in retrospect, what the final
earned premium for the Policy will be for the agreed term of the
Policy.
10.

Under retrospective rating, the final earned premium

is determined by considering a number of factors, including the
amount

of

losses

an

insured

sustains,

administrative

costs,

expenses for adjusting claims, and applicable premium taxes in
accordance with the agreed formula.
11.

Determining premiums retrospectively in the manner

set forth in the Retro Agreements benefits an insured by allowing
it the option of partial

self-insurance, and because of the

retrospective retention, of achieving broader insurance coverage
at a substantially reduced cost compared to the premium for similar
coverage under a standard policy.
12.

The benefits and potential savings to the insured

are dependent upon the insured's loss experience over the agreed
term, as retrospective rating is designed to recognize the merits
of each individual risk based upon the loss experience of the
insured.

Each insured develops its own record with respect to the

premium to be paid at the end of the agreed term.
13.
entering

A substantial part of the consideration to TIE in

into the Retro Agreements with Motor Cargo was the

agreement of Motor Cargo to continue insurance coverage in force
for the specified term of three (3) years rather than the one-year
term of a standard policy.
4

14.

Paragraph 16 of the Retro Agreements provides for

cancellation by either party upon thirty (30) days written notice
and that the premium upon cancellation prifcr to the end of the
three-year term would be computed in accordance with other terms
of

the

agreement,

subject

to

certain

additional

provisions

depending upon whether the insured, Motor Cargo, or the insurer,
TIE, cancelled.
15.

Paragraph 16 also provides, among other things, that

if the insured, Motor Cargo, cancelled the Policy, that the minimum
earned premium would be 110% of the Retrospective Premium or of the
Basic Premium, whichever was greater.
16.

The

cancellation

provision

was

specifically

explained to an officer of Motor Cargo when the Retro Agreement was
entered into, that is, that in the event of cancellation of the
Policy before the three (3) year term ended, Motor Cargo would lose
the benefits of retrospective rating.
17.

In a written notice dated February 28, 1983, Motor

Cargo properly gave notice to TIE to cancel all insurance policies
then in effect between Motor Cargo and TIE, including the Policy.
18.

In accordance with that notice, TIE cancelled the

Policy as of February 28, 1983.
19.

In accordance with the provisions of the Retro

Agreements, following the cancellation of the Policy, and after
making various accounting adjustments, TIE sent Motor Cargo its
final invoice showing a premium due of $68,394.00, which included
a sum equal to 110% of the greater of the Basic Premium or the
5

Retrospective Premium due on Retro Agreement—B, but which gave
Motor Cargo no credit for any excess premium which it claims was
due it.
20.

Motor

Cargo

is

indebted

to

TIE

for

insurance

coverage provided under the Policy and the Retro Agreements in the
principal sum of $68,394.00, plus accruing interest.
21.

Motor Cargo is entitled to the award of reasonable

attorney's fees.
22.

While

all

time

claimed

by

TIE'S

attorney

was

actually spent in prosecuting TIE'S claims against Motor Cargo, the
rate charged was reasonable, and the issues, though limited, were
complex and difficult, some items could have been handled by an
associate in TIE'S law firm or by a clerk at a lesser hourly rate,
even though that decision was ultimately for TIE'S counsel to make
and even though the Court, were he a practicing attorney, would
personally

feel

more

comfortable

handling

those

items.

Accordingly, the attorney's fee requested by TIE'S attorney should
be reduced to $14,500, a reasonable fee under the circumstances.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
herewith enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

In the first instance, the Court is required to look

to the terms of the contract and their plain meaning on questions
of interpretation.

Only when the Court finds the contract to be

ambiguous or inconsistent may it turn to the general rules of
construction, i.e. favoring specific provisions over general,
6

first dated provisions over later, and construction against the
scrivener.
2.
March

The Retro Agreements entered into by the parties on

1, 1979 and on March

1, 1982, are identical with the

exception of some percentage changes in the definition paragraph
of the agreement entered into on March lf 1982.
3.

The definition portion of the I^etro Agreements

defines the terms "Basic Premium" and "Retrospective Premium."
4. Paragraph 4(b) of Retro Agreement—B (the "Agreement")
defines the basic premium as being 76.42% of the Standard Premium.
Paragraph

4(a) defines the

"Standard Preitiium" as the premium

established in the Policy.
5. Paragraph 4(f) of the Agreement Refines »Retrospective
Premium" as:
"The earned premium according to this agreement,
computed as the sum of Incurred Losses, plus Service
Fee, plus Premium Taxes, in no everit to exceed the
Standard Premium."
6.

Paragraph 12 of the Agreement specifically provides

how the Retrospective Premium is to be computed.
7.

Paragraph

13

of

the

Agreement

provides

for

adjustments to the premium for any excess premium under certain
circumstances.
8.

Paragraph 16 of the Agreement provides, among other

things, that either party may cancel on thirty (30) days written
notice and that the premium for cancellation prior to the end of
the term shall be computed in accordance with the other provisions

7

of the Agreement, subject to the additional provisions in Paragraph
16.
9.

One of the additional provisions of Paragraph 16

provides, in part, that if the insured cancels, the minimum
earned premium shall be 110% of the Retrospective or Basic
Premium, whichever is greater.
10.

The Agreement specifically defines Basic Premium

and Retrospective Premium and the manner of their calculation. Any
adjustments thereto provided in the Agreement are not included in
the definition of those terms nor in their calculation.
11.

Paragraph 16 specifically makes any manner of

calculation in the Agreement subject to the provisions of
subparagraph 16(a) which specifically establishes the minimum
earned premium upon cancellation at 110% of the Retrospective
Premium or Basic Premium, whichever is greater.

This paragraph

makes no mention of any adjustments to these calculations, nor
that there is to be a penalty of 10% of any premium so adjusted.
12.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that

the Agreement under its terms is clear and unambiguous and that the
earned premium on cancellation by the insured, Motor Cargo, is
equal to 110% of the Basic Premium or Retrospective Premium,
whichever is greater, as calculated pursuant to Paragraphs 4,
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c); Paragraph 12, and Paragraph 16 of
the Agreement.
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13.

The Basic Premium at the tim£ of the cancellation

was $139,600.00 and the Retrospective Premium at that time was
$82,669.00.
14.

Motor Cargo has paid no excefes premiums, and thus

is entitled to no credit for excess premiums as it contends.
15.

TIE is entitled to judgment On its Second Cause of

Action against Motor Cargo for the sum of $13,960.00, i.e. 10% of
the Basic Premium of $139,600.00, less a credit of $16,530.00 due
the defendant as shown on TIE'S final invoice with the difference
between those sums, namely $2,570.00 to be allowed as a credit
against the principal amount of $70,964.00 awarded against Motor
Cargo in the Summary Judgment dated Februairy 25, 1987, on TIE'S
First Cause of Action, leaving a total principal amount owed by
Motor Cargo to TIE on both causes of action of $68,394.00.
16.

Because Motor Cargo's Amended Counterclaim has been

dismissed and it is entitled to recover nothing thereby or by way
of setoff or defenses in accordance with Paragraph 1 of the Summary
Judgment dated February 25, 1987, TIE is entitled to accruing
interest on the sum of $68,394.00 at the rate of 10% per annum from
February 25, 1988, until

judgment

is entered based upon the

foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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17.

In addition, and as part of the judgment, Motor

Cargo should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees amounting to
$14,500.00 and its costs incurred herein amounting to $60.00.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED this )& day of

jpU .

, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed
by the law firm of MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C., Parkview
Plaza, Suite 260, 2180 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5 Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a true copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law was caused to be served upon:
Jay D. (Jurmankin
Giaque & Williams
500 Keairns B u i l d i n g
136 South Main Street
Salt LaKe City, Utah 84101
by hand-delivery this

VS

day of January, 1989.

tie.m-fndcl
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HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3326
MARK F. BELL - 4536
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260
2180 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801) 484-6161
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
a corporation,
JUDGMENTl
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 34602
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah
corporation,

Judge Rodney S. Page

Defendant.
oooOooo

All issues in this proceeding not heretofore resolved by
the Order and Judgment of the Court dated February 25, 1987,
excepting

those

claims

asserted

in

the

defendant's

Amended

Counterclaim for trade liable and interference with contract and
business advantage, were submitted to the Cou^rt for separate trial
and judgment pursuant to Rules 39(b) and 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure based upon the parties' Motions, the stipulated
facts contained in the parties' Stipulation dated December 16,
1987,

and upon the Affidavits and Memoranda submitted in support

of their respective positions.

The Court thereafter entered its

FILMED

JUDGMENT ENTERED
APP^NDTY

R

written

Memorandum

Decision

dated

May

20,

1988, its written

Supplemental Ruling dated July 27, 1988, and its oral ruling on
January

3,

1989.

Further,

in

accordance with

the parties'

Stipulation of Dismissal dated December 14, 1988, the Court entered
its Order dated December 29, 1988, dismissing the defendant's
Amended Counterclaim,

The Court, having also made and entered its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, herewith
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that the plaintiff do have
and recover judgment against the defendant on the First and Second
Causes of Action of the plaintiff's Complaint in the principal sum
of

Sixty-eight

Thousand

Three

Hundred

Ninety-four

Dollars

($68,394.00), accruing interest on that sum at the rate of ten
percent (10%) per annum or $18.74 per day from February 25, 1988,
until the date hereof, a reasonable attorney's fee of Fourteen
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($14,500.00), and costs of $60.00,
together with interest on the total judgment at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date hereof until paid in full.
This Judgment supersedes the Order and Judgment of the
Court dated February 5, 1987.
DATED this

13^ day of

\*lo »

1989.

BY THE COURT:

District/Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Iy^ o <. .y_» » ^ -

GURMANKIN
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed
by the law firm of MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C., Parkview
Plaza, Suite 260, 2180 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5 Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, a true copy of the foregoing Judgment was caused to be
served upon:
Jay D. Gurmankin
Giaque & Williams
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
by first-class mail on this

tie.m-order

2-

day of February, 1989.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Truck Insurance Exchange, a
corporation,

OPINION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 890180-CA

Motor Cargo, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

)

FILED
JUL 30J990

Second District, Davis County
The Honorable Rodney S. Page
u*nc*^t«Attorneys: Jay D. Gurmankin, Mark Y. Hirata, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
Harold C. Verhaaren, Mark F. Bell, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Greenwood.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Appellee Truck Insurance Exchange (TIE) filed a complaint
against Appellant Motor Cargo for breach of an insurance policy
and a retrospective premium determination agreement. The trial
court found that Motor Cargo is indebted to TIE for insurance
coverage in the principal sum of $68,394, plus accruing
interest. We affirm.
This controversy focuses on a three-year retrospective
premium determination agreement entered into by the parties.
Motor Cargo, which exercised its right to terminate the agreement
after one year, claims that it is only subject under the
agreement to a ten percent cancellation penalty. Under a
different interpretation, TIE claims that Motor Cargo is liable
for a ten percent penalty in the amount of $13,960 and that this
penalty prevents Motor Cargo from recovering $56,931 in
retrospective excess premiums, resulting in an actual total
penalty of fifty-one percent.

APPENDIX C

Two of the agreement's pertinent provisions directly
conflict with one another. Paragraph 13 provides for the refund
of excess retrospective premiums, following the computation of
the retrospective premiums at specified time intervals.
Paragraph 16, on the other hand, provides that "[t]he premium for
a cancellation prior to the end of the term of this agreement
shall be computed in accordance with the other provisions of this
agreement, subject to the following additional provisions."
(Emphasis added.) The operative additional provision in
Paragraph 16 reads "the minimum earned premium shall be 110% of
the Retrospective or Basic Premium, whichever is the greater, but
the amount so calculated shall not exceed the Standard Premium as
defined in this agreement. . . ." The trial court determined
that since the basic premium was higher than the retrospective
premium. Motor Cargo was not entitled to the excess premiums.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that M[i]n contract
actions, we defer to the trial judge on issues of fact, but not
on issues of law." 50 W. Broadway Assoc, v. Redevelopment Agency
of Salt Lake Citv, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989). The supreme
court's standard of review of a trial court's interpretation of a
contract is that:
A contract's interpretation may be
either a question of law, determined by
the words of the agreement, or a question
of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence
of intent. If a trial court interprets a
contract as a matter of law, we accord its
construction no particular weight,
reviewing its action under a correctness
standard. However, if the contract is not
an integration or is ambiguous and the
trial court proceeds to find facts
respecting the intentions of the parties
based on extrinsic evidence, then our
review is strictly limited.
Id. (quoting Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985)).
This court has stated that M[i]n the first instance, the
determination of whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a
question of law." Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert. 784
P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "Where questions arise in
the interpretation of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is
within the document itself. It should be looked at in its
entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of its parts
should be given effect insofar as that is possible." Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake Citv, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).

We disagree with the trial court's legal conclusion that the
contract in this case is unambiguous. Paragraph 16 acknowledges
the refund provision of Paragraph 13, while at the same time
imposing a penalty that arguably disregards Paragraph 13. A
plain reading of the contract does not indicate whether "in
accordance with" Paragraph 13 controls over the contract being
"subject to" the additional provisions of Paragraph 16. Nor does
a plain reading lead to the sure conclusion that Motor Cargo
would give up the premium refund plus pay a penalty rather than
being subject to the more customary trade penalty of ten percent.
Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to construe an ambiguous
contract. See 50 W. Broadway Assoc, 784 P.2d at 1171; Kimball,
699 P.2d at 716. This contract's ambiguity requires extrinsic
evidence in order for the contract to be properly interpreted.
The court received such extrinsic evidence and refers to it in
the findings. Such evidence showed that the parties discussed
the provisions at issue prior to entering into the agreement and
that they knew the excess premium refund would be lost in the
event of cancellation by Motor Cargo. We therefore hold that the
trial court correctly admitted extrinsic evidence in this case
and, under the standard set forth in Kimball,1 we leave the
court's findings of fact undisturbed.

**TS*5H^*»

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JuditJjJM. Billings, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. M[I]f the contract is not an integration or is ambiguous and
the trial court proceeds to find facts respecting the intentions
of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, then our review is
strictly limited.- Kimball, 699 P.2d at 716.
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FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Lite.") C c u n * A C L A S I S

Truck Insurance Exchange/ a
corporation,

ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 890180-CA

v.
Motor Cargo, a Utah corporation,
Defendants and Appellant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed August 10,
1990,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this

/

*

*

•

day of August, 1990.

FOR THE COURT

Mary*T/ Noonan, Clerk

cOEiVED
Auu 181990

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of August, 1990, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING was deposited in the United States mail or personally
delivered to each of the parties below.
Jay D. Gurmankin
Mark Y. Hirata
Attorneys at Law
Giauque, Williams, Wilcox & Bendinger
136 South Main
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Harold C. Verhaaren
Mark F. Bell
Mazuran, Verhaaren & Hayes, P,C,
Attorneys at Law
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260
2180 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

DATED this 17th day of August, 1990.

